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1 Introduction
Modern data-driven technologies are providing us with new capabilities for work-
ing with data across diverse storage architectures and analyzing it in unified
frameworks to yield powerful insights. Even as the benefits of these technologies
come into focus, they are fueling a corresponding debate over the responsible use
of data and the urgency of mitigating privacy risks to individuals. This discus-
sion is happening as new analysis techniques, based on correlating data across
sources and types and exploiting statistical structure, have challenged classical
approaches to privacy, leading to a need for radical rethinking of the meaning of
privacy and its application to federated databases.
New technologies have often triggered concerns about the privacy of individ-
uals, dating back to the advent of publishing photographs in newspapers and
even earlier [38]. The origin of modern data protection and privacy laws can be
traced as far back as 1972, when the public learned that the U.S. government
had been holding secret databases of information about citizens. In a forma-
tive report created in response to the episode [36], a study committee at the
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare articulated a set of core
Fair Information Practices (FIPs) that have formed the basis of nearly every
subsequent privacy and data protection law [14]. Attempting to mitigate these
concerns and to operationalize protections around them has led to a rich field of
privacy study across several disciplines.
This paper situates these concerns in light of research on polystores [7] and
database federation more generally. While the correlation of data across stores
presents significant new privacy risks, it also provides new opportunities for
interventions and mitigations. This paper outlines this situation and presents a
research agenda for research in data privacy for the database community.
2 Traditional Approaches to Privacy in Databases
The study of privacy in computer science largely emerged from the broader study
of security, inheriting a focus on concepts like confidentiality. This section briefly
surveys traditional approaches, while Section 3 describes ways in which they are
insu cient to the task of protecting privacy.
Access control In databases, privacy-as-confidentiality has often meant assign-
ing permissions and roles to database users [2]. Modern applications of this idea
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include data tagging systems, which maintain metadata about data items to
enable access and query policies [5]. Together, these methods support the im-
portant goal of limiting who (or which processes) can access what data items
in what contexts at what times. At the same time, they do not directly pro-
vide a way to protect the semantics of the underlying data items. Moreover,
these methods are not tailored to limit what can be learned from data when
access is allowed, for example to protect against misuse by insiders or against
authorized-but-privacy-impinging uses.
Query and Result Filtering To complement access control and enable more flex-
ible policies, the database community has invested significant research e↵ort
in developing query auditing and result filtering systems [25]. Auditing provides
two significant improvements over methods purely based on access control: First,
auditing allows for flexible, detailed, and context-sensitive policies, as decisions
can be based on arbitrary processing of query text, rather than a model based
on rows, columns, and user roles. Second, auditing decision can be made in an
online fashion, adapting to the history of prior queries based on estimates of the
cumulative privacy risk. However, these systems generally define such risks in
the frame of controlling individual pieces of data.
Anonymization Another line of work considers how to render information in
databases or outputs anonymous, meaning that rows of data cannot be asso-
ciated to a particular individual. This extends the concept of privacy beyond
information flow to the protection of individual identities. The question of what
constitutes an identity is, however, di cult and its answers are hotly contested.
Traditional approaches to anonymization focus on syntactic properties of data
sets, such as the property that no query can return fewer than k individuals [34],
or that any result set has at least ` distinct values for a protected sensitive at-
tribute [22]. Many legal definitions of identity treat data as belonging to one of
two categories: “personally identifiable information” (PII) and “not personally
identifiable information. This separation is easy to implement in code; however,
it elides an important fact (discussed in detail in Section 3: syntactic methods
are insu cient to prevent the disclosure of attributes of individuals [27] and so
have given way to more information-theoretic protections.
Di↵erential Privacy Over the last 15 years, a formal approach to privacy has
emerged from a branch of computer science known as di↵erential privacy. Re-
searchers in this field design computer systems that employ randomness or noise
to conceal information about individuals. Moreover, a mathematical proof char-
acterizes the privacy loss that can befall any individual in the worst case.
The term di↵erential privacy does not refer to a single technique, but rather
a mathematical standard. It guarantees that the behavior of a computer system
is very similar whether an individual is included in a database or removed [9,8].
The degree of similarity is controlled by a parameter ✏, which represents the
maximum amount of information that an adversary can learn about an individual
by studying the mechanism output. Conceptually, a smaller ✏ provides stronger
privacy protection, but there is usually a cost in the form of greater noise and thus
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limited utility from queries. Many heuristics have been proposed to determine
an appropriate value of ✏ [26,21,16,19].
From a di↵erent angle, the parameter ✏ can be viewed as a measure of (worst-
case) privacy loss for a given algorithm. A useful property of di↵erential privacy is
additive composition, meaning that when multiple queries are run in sequence,
the individual ✏’s can be added together to yield a bound for the entire pro-
cess [10]. This allows organizations to manage access using a privacy budget.
Each time a query is run, the corresponding ✏ is subtracted from the budget.
When the budget is exhausted, the data must be permanently retired to ensure
the privacy guarantee holds.
3 Polystores as privacy risk
We have outlined a toolkit of existing privacy defenses, including access control,
query and result filtering, anonymization, and di↵erential privacy. These are
all valuable tools, but each has limitations. In this section, we present three
stylized facts to explain why existing approaches to privacy are insu cient to
protect individuals, and why database federation only exacerbates the problem.
To meet evolving risks to privacy, it will therefore be necessary to look beyond
traditional technologies and develop new areas of research.
Statistical inference presents new privacy threats. Syntactic approaches to database
anonymization – such as k-anonymity and `-diversity preserve the structure of
the data and the relationships between data elements. This structure can of-
ten be exploited, along with information outside the database, to “re-identify”
or “de-anonymize” the database. Early e↵orts by Narayanan and Shmatikov
demonstrated that this could be achieved at large scale [29]. Subsequent work
has demonstrated an almost complete failure of anonymization techniques to
protect individuals [27]. A corollary of this is that the legal notion of personally
identifiable information (PII) (known in the GDPR as “personal data”) should
now be considered obsolete, and all data should be treated as if it is “personal”
or “identifying” unless there is a strong case that it is not [28].
One reason for this is the ease of determining functional identifiers in large,
rich data sets, or sets of attributes which are held by only one individual in
that collection. Such identifiers “single out” individuals, implying a set of binary
queries for which the individual has a unique set of answers [6]. Representation-
ally, such queries could be treated as the bits of a numeric identifier, which would
clearly qualify as personal and identifiable data under existing legal regimes (see
Section 4) [30]. A curious corollary of this argument is that a 33-bit identifier
would su ce to identify all humans on earth uniquely. 1 Thus, any reasonably
rich data set should be considered to contain such functional identifiers.
Database federation presents new and heightened risks. A central motivation for
the federation of disparate databases is the idea that cross-referencing the data
across them will yield new and better insights. It is therefore natural that such
1 233 = 8, 589, 934, 592, compared to a world population of around 7.7 billion.
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cross-source correlation may enable the increased extraction of sensitive infor-
mation about individuals, groups of people, or organizations. In fact, federated
databases share several features that contribute to increased privacy risks. First,
it is clear that cross-referencing data across many sources abstractly creates data
items with more attributes, providing more free parameters for the construction
of functional identifiers as described above. Second, it is often the case that
these systems are built to enable downstream analytics processing or machine
learning pipelines. Such processing naturally seeks to determine how to sepa-
rate, cluster, and classify data items and so can be thought of as inherently and
automatically constructing such identification schemes. Finally, consolidation of
data across data sources risks undermining assumptions made during the pol-
icy establishment process when sources were not federated. Even properties as
straightforward as access control or data permissions can be so subverted as to
be totally violated when such assumptions change [2]. Relatedly, centralization
of data access creates new and attractive points of attack for outside hackers
or malicious insiders. Such “attacks” on privacy can also occur without malice,
simply through the authorized realization that new insights are possible through
analysis of newly combined data, undermining existing business logic.
Di↵erential privacy requires design-level intervention. One might hope that we
can take an arbitrary algorithm and make it di↵erentially private. Unfortunately,
this is not the case in general. As di↵erentially private algorithms require noise to
protect any possible input data value, su cient noise must be introduced to mask
the presence or absence of any input that possibly alters the output of an algo-
rithm, even in the worst-case. This amount of noise can be unbounded, implying
that an infinite amount of noise might be required to achieve this privacy defini-
tion. More generally, di↵erential privacy is di cult to achieve for computations
that are sensitive to the input of a single value over an unbounded domain, such
as the reporting the mean, the smallest and largest order statistics, and other
non-robust statistics that operate over the entire real line. Without additional
modifications of the problem statement, such as placing domain restrictions or
bounds on the input space or by replacing a sensitive algorithm with a more
statistically-robust one, we cannot ensure that any arbitrary algorithm can be
made di↵erentially private with a finite (let alone reasonable) noise budget ✏.
While there are circumstances where such assumptions and modifications can
be reasonably made in practice, we cannot immediately make use of di↵erential
privacy in every possible deployment scenario. It should be noted that this is
not a bug in the di↵erential privacy approach, but rather a feature, as it forces
the algorithm designer to consider computational tools that are synergistic with
the goal of not revealing “too much” about a single individual. It also suggests a
need for thinking about privacy at the design stage and encourages the adoption
of contextually relevant protection mechanisms.
4 The Policy Landscape
We briefly set forth provisions in a selection of applicable laws and policies
which bear on how privacy requirements are set within practical data governance
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regimes as they concern the design, engineering, and operation of database sys-
tems; because we are from the U.S. context, our summary is very U.S.-focused.
GDPR The European Union’s new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
provides for a baseline standard of data protection and privacy that applies
across all EU and European Economic Area (EEA) countries. The GDPR applies
to all data about EU citizens, regardless of where in the world the data are
collected or held, and violations carry maximum fines of e10 million or 4% of a
company’s global turnover. In addition to requiring traditional privacy notions
based around confidentiality (e.g., collecting, storing, and processing only the
data necessary to achieve some particular purpose and limiting processing only to
claimed purposes), the GDPR provides a number of rights of interest to database
design and operation. The general framework applies to “personal data”, which
is broadly speaking any data that can be tied to an individual person. While the
law defines several classes of information which are a rmatively personal data,
the question of whether functional identifiers should be treated as personal data
remains unsettled [6]. Several special provisions apply to data processing defined
as “profiling”, which broadly covers any “automated processing of personal data”
which “evaluate[s] certain personal aspects relating to a natural person”.
Articles 9 and 10 restrict the processing of several classes of sensitive data for
certain purposes, for example Article 9 stipulates that “racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership,
and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely
identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a nat-
ural person’s sex life or sexual orientation shall be prohibited” unless one of
several conditions is met, such as the acquiring of a rmative consent. Article
10 prohibits processing based on criminal history except as allowed under the
law of the relevant EU member state. But as noted above, the ease of inferring
sensitive data makes it challenging to comply with these provisions, as covered
personal data may be created or inferred during processing [37].
Articles 15–17 provide for subject access, rectification, and erasure rights,
which enable subjects to demand all personal data about them, the ability to al-
ter and correct those data, and the right to request that all such data be deleted.
These rights apply whether data have been gathered from the subject directly
or indirectly Implementing these processes e ciently represents a formidable
engineering challenge in the era of large, distributed, federated databases. In
particular, deletion may prove a challenge in systems where removing a single
subject’s data would prove costly or require denormalization or reindexing.
Article 20 provides for a right to data portability, which stipulates that sub-
jects should be able to extract their data in open, machine-readable formats.
This is more straightforward, but the nature of what formats are acceptable
could benefit from input by the database community.
Articles 18, 21, and 22 provide for rights of the data subject to object to
processing in a number of situations, including the use of data for marketing pur-
poses and situations where processing is “solely automated”. An active scholarly
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and legal debate further asks whether these rights require that automated deci-
sions be explained to data subjects and what that would require [33], although
stronger explanatory rights may exist in Articles 13–15.
CCPA The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) is a new state law in
California, which takes e↵ect on 1 January 2020 and provides a number of new
consumer rights to California residents, including the right to access, rectify,
and delete data similar to the GDPR. Additionally, the CCPA provides for data
breach notification and the right to object to the sale of personal information,
as well as the right to know when data are transferred to or shared with third
parties and to opt out of most data sharing. Once again, the problematic issue
of determining when data are personal data and thus covered under the law
remains open to interpretation by both by technologists and in courts.
HIPAA The U.S. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
governs the use of most medical and healthcare data in the United States. HIPAA
provides a list of enumerated categories of “protected health information” (PHI)
and a list of “covered entities” which must follow the rules, such as hospitals,
insurance companies, and medical providers. The U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services has created and administers the enforcement of a detailed
HIPAA Security Rule, which defines exactly what data practices are and are not
acceptable under the law. Broadly, however, HIPAA requires that patients give
consent or receive notice for many uses of their data and that covered entities not
share PHI without consent or to unauthorized other entities (covered or not).
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission Another tool in the policy landscape is are
the unfairness and deceptive doctrines of Section 5 of the FTC Act. While not a
privacy law per se, the unfairness and deception doctrines have become a major
part of the US privacy policy landscape by policing behavior in the marketplace
that is detrimental to consumers’ privacy interests [15]. These flexible pieces of
policy can be applied to many di↵erent situations, entities, and technologies.
Under Section 5, an act is deceptive if there exists a material representation,
omission, or practice that is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under
the circumstances [11], whereas unfairness describes practices that cause or are
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers that are not outweighed by the
benefits to consumers or competition and are not reasonably avoidable [12].
5 Polystores as Privacy Opportunity: A Research Agenda
We have identified a gap between traditional approaches to privacy protection in
databases and the modern understanding of privacy risks, especially those based
on statistical inference. By facilitating cross-referencing of data across stores and
faster deployment of models, polystore technologies have the potential to extend
analytical capabilities and widen this gap. At the same time, we believe that the
current interest in new polystore architectures presents an opportunity to create
technologies that improve privacy protection in a meaningful way.
There is a natural alignment between the goal of protecting privacy and a
polystore architecture. We now understand that privacy is not a property of
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individual queries or even individual datastores. If we are to build any code
that engages with privacy in a meaningful way, it will need the global visibility
a↵orded by a polystore layer. As polystores enter operation, they will in turn
provide a useful testbed for a range of privacy-preserving technologies
We identify three goals that make up a future-oriented research agenda for
privacy in polystores. One is motivated by fair information practices and com-
pliance with existing laws. The second and third are complementary responses
to the advance of algorithms for inferring personal information.
5.1 Reconcile legal regimes with algorithmic capabilities
Our first research goal is motivated by the di culty of mapping concepts from
law onto the techniques of computer science. New privacy regulations like GDPR
and the CCPA have created considerable uncertainty for companies, which have
incurred significant expenditures in the hopes of being compliant without nec-
essarily achieving confidence in their fidelity to legal requirements [18]. The
meanings of many legal provisions are still being tested in courts, and may yet
evolve in response to changing technologies. At the core of this issue are the very
di↵erent languages used by the legal and computer science communities. Legal
concepts like ”singling out” are di cult to identify in technical architecture, and
technical obstacles may conflict with the meaning anticipated in law [6].
Whether legal requirements can or should be formalized, and whether such
formalizations are better conceptualized as necessary (as in Cohen and Nis-
sim [6]) or su cient (as in Nissim et al. [31]) conditions that approximate legal
requirements is an inherently contextual question, based on the application sce-
nario and the particular law at issue. Computer scientists often attempt to sep-
arate “policy” from “mechanism” in abstractions and subsequently assume that
policy is given and the job of a mechanism is to ensure fidelity to that policy.
However, such an approach is impoverished in the many important situations
where acceptable outcomes and unacceptable outcomes are di cult to separate
ex ante but must instead be established via oversight and review [20].
Laws are often specified in terms of flexible standards or general principles,
which are applicable in many contexts and at di↵erent levels of abstraction,
rather than actionable rules [13]. Because standards and principles are evalu-
ated according to the balancing of countervailing concerns and may hinge on
vague concepts such as standards of “reasonableness”, they are generally not
amenable to encoding as system requirements. Legal requirements are rarely, if
ever, specific enough to be formalizable directly in code.
To address this gap, we foresee the need for interdisciplinary research teams,
rooted in database technology and law. Such teams will be well positioned to
understand the interface between computer systems and legal requirements, de-
signing guarantees that support legal needs or compliance goals by providing
relevant information or establishing key properties that can be consumed by the
non-software processes of litigation, assessment, or other oversight rather than
attempting to guarantee consistency with the law up front. For example, while
it may be di cult to establish up front to what extent the use of sensitive classes
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of data (e.g., gender, race, political a lations, or correllates of such attributes)
constitutes illegal discrimination, systems can maintain query logs that aggre-
gate estimates of how influential such categories have been based on models of
the population in a database [1]. To match legal language to the capabilities of
polystores will require explicit collaboration with legal scholars, who can inter-
pret not only what laws are relevant and what these laws require, but how best
to support their actual operationalization in real systems.
Interesting open questions in this area, prompted by the existing policy land-
scape include: Prompted by deletion rights in GDPR and CCPA and by the
“right to be forgotten” in the GDPR, if a system can undo deletions, for ex-
ample by restoring from a crash log or by losing deletion lists for write-only or
write-mostly backing stores (e.g., tape libraries), when can data be safely con-
sidered deleted? If we delete an individual’s data from a database, what about
downstream uses of those data - can we track what computations or models de-
rived from these data now require updating? Do machine learning models based
on deleted data fall under these legal erasure rights? (The last of these is largely a
legal question, but the database community must design in light of its uncertain
answer.) Prompted by legal regimes that protect the use of sensitive data for
significant computations (e.g., the GDPR) or which outlaw discrimination (sev-
eral laws in many jurisdictions), must we carefully track the storage and use of
data which can be used to make sensitive inferences, such as race, color, national
origin, gender, religion, age, sexual activity and orientation, disability or health
status, political a liation, or genetic information? Additionally, prompted by
subject access and correction rights in the GDPR, the CCPA, and sectoral laws
in the US including HIPAA, FCRA, and ECOA, database systems should be pre-
pared to answer queries that return all data about a particular individual and
which allow these data to be corrected or deleted. Questions around schemata
and workload support for such rights are important in practice.
5.2 Develop Accountability Mechanisms for Privacy Protection
Traditional privacy defenses, including access control, anonymization, as well as
di↵erentially private systems, can be viewed as preventative mechanisms. Like
a fence or a moat, they are designed to foreclose the possibility of a privacy
breach in advance, without the need for any active steps on the part of a sys-
tem owner. Unfortunately, access control and anonymization are insu cient to
counter modern attacks, and di↵erentially private solutions may not be avail-
able for the vast majority of the computations that a typical company performs
on data. The alternative to prevention, to borrow a term from the security lit-
erature, is accountability. An accountability system can be seen instead as an
alarm: its purpose is not to prevent all privacy breaches in advance, but rather
to make breaches detectable and attributable to individuals. Given the limita-
tions of preventative systems, further research into accountability systems will
be needed to provide privacy protection for many uses of databases in the future.
At its core, an accountability system for privacy needs the ability to measure
the risk to individuals that arises from a given pattern of access. Such techniques
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can be used to monitor the overall level of protection for users, to flag suspicious
query behavior, and to support systems of deterrence for insiders. For sequences
of queries that pose unusual privacy risks to individuals, such measures could
trigger automatic suppression of results or assist firms in compliance e↵orts.
In certain cases, it may be appropriate to apply formal methods from di↵eren-
tial privacy to measure risk in an accountability system. However, such methods
are based on worst-case analysis and would lead to a conclusion of infinite pri-
vacy loss for many common database operations. To provide useful insight for
these cases, new measurement techniques are required, which provide finite re-
sults in most cases, and are responsive to common human patterns of access that
threaten privacy. Because such techniques will be based on a adversary model
with limited capabilities, we will refer to them as privacy heuristics.
It is important to stress that privacy heuristics, by their nature, are not a
perfect defense against the leaking of personal information. There is no limit
to how clever a determined attacker may be in obfuscating an attempt to gain
private information. Moreover, a higher standard of protection, including dif-
ferential privacy, should be used for any output that is shared with the public.
However, we believe that privacy heuristics have an important role to play in
mitigating risks. It should be possible to recognize common patterns of behavior
with high risks to individual privacy. Even in the case of a deliberate attack that
aims to uncover an individual’s secret, it may be possible to increase the cost to
the attacker, or the probability of being discovered.
Future work on accountability systems for privacy can draw on diverse fields
of study. New heuristics may be inspired by concepts from law, such as the
GDPR’s notion of “singling out.” They may be informed by empirical studies of
past privacy breaches, and responsive to particularly sensitive types of informa-
tion. Search algorithms can be developed to detect when individual information
can be extracted by di↵erencing outputs across multiple queries or multiple is-
lands. Finally, techniques from machine learning can be leveraged to recognize
query patterns when an adversary deliberately obfuscates an attempt to gain pri-
vate information. Taken together, we believe that these e↵orts can yield broad
advances in how personal information is handled by firms and governments.
5.3 Incorporate Formal Privacy Techniques into Private Islands
As firms and governments seek to extract value from databases, they often en-
counter use cases for which informal protections based on accountability systems
are insu cient. For some companies, it may be that sensitive data is accessed
by too many employees to maintain a reasonable standard of accountability. At
times, it may be necessary to present the results of an analysis to the public or
to share data with outside collaborators.
To enable applications like these, we envision an e↵ort to incorporate tech-
niques from di↵erential privacy into polystore systems. We note that the poly-
store layer is an appropriate place to deploy formally private algorithms, since
it can maintain a view of what data is associated with individual units across
various datastores. Algorithms can be naturally organized into formally private
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islands that accept a limited range of commands, and inject randomness into all
output before it is returned to the user. To accommodate the possibility of mul-
tiple private islands, a centralized privacy accountant is required to maintain a
privacy budget and allocate it across islands, users, and queries. This accountant
can be based on the ✏ of di↵erential privacy, but also on alternative measures
rooted in information theory or statistical inference.
The di↵erential privacy literature contains a number of algorithms that can
be immediately deployed in formally private islands. One strand of research con-
cerns formally private algorithms that are appropriate for relational databases.
This vein includes the PINQ [23] system, which provides analyst with a lim-
ited “SQL-like” language, as well as the system used by Uber for internal data
analytics [17]. Private SQL has also been explored within federated database
environments. Shrinkwrap is a private data federation that allows users of a sys-
tem to have a di↵erentially private view of other user’s data that is a robust
against computationally bounded adversaries [3]. When deploying formally pri-
vate systems, care must be taken so that practical constraints of computing do
not interfere with the theoretical privacy guarantees. For example, floating point
representations can lead to privacy losses [24].
Another active area of di↵erential privacy research concerns private imple-
mentations of machine learning algorithms. For algorithms that rely on stochas-
tic gradient descent, a “bolt-on” implementation of di↵erentially private gradient
descent has been designed specifically to scale well for modern analytics sys-
tems [39]. For more general machine learning tasks, di↵erentially private models
can be constructed using the PATE framework [32]. Within federated systems,
research is underway on the development of private federated learning methods
that aim to construct machine learning models without specifically requiring
individual user’s data at runtime in a centralized location [4,35].
These existing solutions provide an excellent starting point for incorporating
formal privacy standards and techniques into polystore systems. The intersec-
tion of these fields suggests a number of directions for possible future research.
For one thing, work is needed to shed light on the proper design of a privacy
accountant. The accountant bears the central task of allocating privacy budgets
across individuals and across queries. Significant gains can be found by perform-
ing this role intelligently, directing privacy budget to important queries that
require greater accuracy. In another direction, an advanced privacy accountant
may recognize when queries are similar across di↵erent islands, and utilize shared
randomness to save on privacy budget. Finally, work is needed on the design of
interfaces that enable analysts to consider the privacy implications of their work
and adjust their workflows to balance utility with privacy risk. This last direction
would benefit from collaborations between database experts, di↵erential privacy
practitioners, and researchers in human-computer interaction.
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